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Counter-terrorism - Aotearoa and Germany

The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) is Germany's domestic intelligence agency. Its main function is the surveillance of anti-constitutional activities in Germany. Along with the police, they monitor radical groups and attempt to prosecute left-wing activists under terrorism legislation (created in 1976 to jail members of the Red Army Faction and other urban guerilla groups). However, last year's operations under anti-terrorism legislations displays a chilling parallel between state repression in Germany and here in Aotearoa.

Legislating against Terrorism in Germany…

Paragraph 129a was created in the 1976 to fight the Red Army Faction, the Movement of 2nd June and other urban guerilla groups of the 70s and covers membership or support of a terrorist organisation. There is no definition of what the authorities see as 'terrorism'. One does not have to commit any crimes to be prosecuted under §129a. The law states that you can be convicted if you are a member of a group whose intentions/means/purpose it is to commit serious crimes or a group that commits serious crimes (like murder, crimes against humanity but also computer sabotage, interference with telecommunication equipment and the possession of weapons). If you are considered a member of the organisation, you can be prosecuted for all its alleged actions. The group has to have 3 or more members. Only 3% of §129a investigations in the 1990's have resulted in convictions, however it was a great fishing expedition for the authorities.
More: Der Terror-Paragraph (in German)

… and Aotearoa

On 15th October 2007, the word 'terrorism' invaded the homes of dozens of activists around Aotearoa, of the Ruatoki community, civil society and the media. No one, except the forces of the state, was prepared - in a state of confusion everybody watched the events unfold. The Terrorism Suppression Act (TSA) was boxed through parliament and finally passed on 8th October 2002. Participating in a terrorist organisation is an offence. However, the definition of a terrorist organisation is either "a designated terrorist entity" or "an entity that carries out, or participates in the carrying out of, 1 or more terrorist acts." A terrorist act is "carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause". [ Terrorist act defined ]

Terror in Germany and Aotearoa - a comparison

This table compares 'Operation 8' - the police operation that lead to raids across Aotearoa on 15th October 2007 - and *some* recent §129a arrests and raids against left-wing activists in Germany. It does not yet include the raids in December 2007 which targeted Turkish and Kurdish communist of the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (13 houses were raided). Included are the police operations against the militante gruppe (the militant group), activists in Bad Oldesloe and Berlin and the raids in connection with last year's G8 summit.
Operation 8 129a (4 different operations)
Start of investigations: 2006 2001
Accused: 20 (for 12 charges under the Terrorism Suppression Act were sought) 41
Houses raided Around 50 over 70
Remanded in custody: 16 to start with, 11 by the time it was announced that TSA charges won't be laid 4 at one point, now none
Number of bugged phones: Dozens around 100 phones and 60 email addresses
Number of people named in the disclosure: Hundreds around 2000
In Aotearoa, the Solicitor-General David Collins announced on 8th November 2007 that "at this stage there is insufficient evidence to establish to the very high standard required that a group or entity was planning or preparing to commit a terrorist act as defined in the legislation." Everybody is currently on bail facing charges under the Arms Act. However, four further arrests have been made since bringing the number of accused to 20. In Germany, the authorities stopped all four §129a operations mentioned above. All of them are now §129 investigations instead - rather than forming a terrorist organisation they are accused of being members of criminal organisations.

Annual reports - what they know and do

The Verfassungsschutz publishes an annual report (this year's is 291 pages long) which is divided into several parts: "right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamic terrorism, extremist organisations of foreigners (not Islamic), espionage and Scientology." Indymedia is used as source several times and is said to be "an internetplatform used by left-extremists." The report is a fairly good indicator what the 2503 (!) employees of the Verfassungsschutz look at.

In Aotearoa, no such report exists. However, the NZ Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the police produce annual reports. Had anybody bothered to read these for 2006 or 2007, we would have stumbled across words such as "individuals who have been assessed as putting New Zealanders' security at risk" were investigated (SIS) and the "Police were involved in four regional policing operations that had potential implications for New Zealand's national security in a regional context."

What we know - reading the lines

New Zealand's equivalent of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz is the Security Intelligence Service.

Security Intelligence Service (SIS) reports
The NZ Security Intelligence Service's report for 06/07 states that for the first time since 2001, the spy agency has investigated "individuals who have been assessed as putting New Zealanders' security at risk." The report also states that the SIS had monitored those with links to terrorist organisation and investigated the "process of radicalisation".

The highly secretive service usually lists, in broad terms, what areas it has worked in. This frequently includes investigating people in New Zealand with suspected links to 'Islamic extremists' and 'terrorist groups', and foreign spies working here. However, mention of possible threats on the country's soil are rare.

As of 30th June 2007, the SIS had 183 staff (up from 150 the previous year). They say 20 interception warrants were in force during the year ending 30th June 2007. 12 were issued during that year and 8 were issued under the previous year but remained in place. The average length the warrants were in force was 142 days and methods of interception and seizure used were listening devices and the copying of documents.

Police reports
In the NZ Police's report for the year ending on 30th June 2007, a section called "Police Outcome: Increase National Security" is of interest. "While there have been no terrorist activities directed at New Zealand, the threat of terrorism is taken as very real. […] In 2006/07, Police were involved in four regional policing operations that had potential implications for New Zealand's national security in a regional context. […] The National Strategic Intelligence Unit has produced a number of strategic and tactical reports on issues related to national security. This reporting has led to targeted investigations in New Zealand in conjunction with other enforcement and intelligence agencies. […] Three Special Investigation Groups in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch work with the Strategic Intelligence Unit and the overseas liaison network. They are principally involved in the investigation of national security-related crime."

In the 2006 report it says the "Police has been involved in two regional policing operations that have potential implications for New Zealand's national security in a regional context. […] The Strategic Intelligence Unit has undertaken a number of strategic and operational assessments on the various crimes contributing to threats to national security" and in 2005: "Special Investigation Groups, whose work is to complement that of the Strategic Intelligence Unit and the overseas liaison officer network, were established in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch in January 2005. These groups are dedicated to the investigation of national security-related crime including terrorism. An Identity Intelligence Unit has been established to become the source of expertise in this area and assist districts, other government agencies and oversee law enforcement agencies in developing intelligence and investigative solutions to combat identity crimes."

In 2004 the "Strategic Intelligence Unit has undertaken a number of strategic and operational assessments on the various crimes contributing to threats to national security. These assessments have led to targeted investigations in New Zealand in conjunction with overseas enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Strategic Intelligence Unit has participated in a range of training scenarios to ensure their skills are developed and maintained to a high level. The Strategic Intelligence Unit has led, or contributed with other agencies, to the development of a number of threat assessments to inform decision making and security contingencies."

Compare this with the 2001 report where there is no mention of national security and the word 'terror' only appears once: the Special Operations Team "co-ordinated the major anti-terrorist exercise 'Guardian'."

The following positions have been established since 2001:

  • An Assistant Commissioner, Jon White, to take an executive lead on counter-terrorism and national security matters
  • A full time Special Tactics Group to respond operationally to terrorist emergencies
  • A full time Specialist Search Group and National Bomb Data Centre Manager
  • A new Strategic Intelligence Unit (SIU)
  • New liaison positions at diplomatic missions in London, Washington DC and Jakarta, and the pending creation of a further liaison position in Suva
  • Additional police at six New Zealand airports.
Jon White was in charge of the raids in October 2007. The Specialist Search Group, formed in 1984 (!) were used in 1990 Commonwealth Games, CHOGM, APEC, royal and VIP tours. On 15th October 2007, they were in the raiding party in Wellington. The Special Investigation Group, under Aaron Lee Pascoe, were in charge of 'Operation 8'. Their infrastructure was set up in 2004 and by 2006, they were "involved in two regional policing operations that have potential implications for New Zealand's national security in a regional context."

It is a mad cycle: legislation passed -> budget increased, special units set up -> report about 'threats' found -> budget increased, staff increased -> more threats found, etc. which is basically the same way that academic research works - the annual report of any science department always states that there are promising leads for a new discovery/theory/etc but more funding is needed to find out more. Or as Ross Meurant, former police officer and head of the Red Squad in the 1981 Springbok tour, put it: "Police say they have collated information over a period of 12 months which on analysis leads them to the conclusion that there is a real threat to the stability and security of our country. The problem as I see it is, that information they have has been self assessed by the same people who collate the data or, at best, by the supervisor of the "intelligence unit" and his superior; all of whom view society from within the forest [=police culture] and with vested interests in producing an outcome which justifies the retention of their unit. These subjective conclusions are presented to judicial officers as the basis of justification for warrants and implementation of anti terror legislation which abrogate the most basic of our legal rights."

Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG)
CTAG comprises officials from Police, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the Government Communications Security Bureau and was established in December 2004. They produced some 200+ reports in 2007 alone and between December 2005 and October 2007, 374 Combined Threat Assessment Group reports have been generated. According to Winston Peters "the material ranges from being extremely sensitive and complex to the more mundane." We do not know yet, what role CTAG played as a whole. We only know that John Key and Helen Clark were briefed the week before the raids (presumably by CTAG).

Conclusion

The four §129a investigations and the state terrorist raids in Aotearoa are strikingly similar: anti-terrorism legislations give the police vast amount of power to go on fishing expeditions. They monitor phones, bug cars and install cameras to gather information on activists. In the end, the terrorism conspiracy collapses. What remains are long court cases and the emotional scars of the raids.

Unlike in Germany, the NZ authorities don't produce a report focusing on 'extremism'. The SIS operates very secretively. However, what little information we have points towards obvious conclusions. When the police talk about being "involved in four regional policing operations that had potential implications for New Zealand's national security in a regional context", then they mean us. Whether 'Operation 8' was one of those four or more than one (one in Auckland, one in the Bay of Plenty and one in Wellington for example) is not known.

Links to §129a: soligruppenord.blogsport.de | einstellung.so36.net/en | delete129a.blogsport.de | soligruppe.blogsport.de | de.indymedia.org
Links to 15th October: october15thsolidarity.info | tuhoe.net | indymedia.org.nz